

OPENING THE WINDOW



Pak-India Rapprochement as a
Prerequisite for Peace in the Region



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*The opinions expressed in this policy paper are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the organization*

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TABLE OF CONTENT

1.	Executive Summary -----	03
3.	Introduction-----	05
4.	RSS and the Role of Hindu Nationalism in Shaping Indian Policy -----	09
5.	How did India’s decades-long strategy suddenly unravel? -----	14
6.	Why has peace become a strategic necessity in South Asia? -----	20
7.	How can India and Pakistan move toward a sustainable peace? -----	24
8.	Conclusion -----	28



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

South Asia stands at a critical inflection point where the logic of confrontation is increasingly giving way to the imperatives of coexistence. While war has long been treated as a blunt instrument of statecraft, contemporary realities have exposed its futility in a nuclearized, economically interdependent, and politically volatile environment. Pakistan and India, having repeatedly tested the limits of coercion, now face a narrowing window in which diplomacy must be allowed to do the heavy lifting if the region is to be pulled back from the brink.

Within India's strategic and ideological firmament, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) has long been a seminal, yet deeply contentious, force in sculpting nationalist thought and steering foreign policy inclinations. Its pervasive influence, inextricably bound up with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has reinforced a majoritarian narrative that casts Pakistan as the perennial adversary, thereby hardening



public sentiment and handcuffing diplomatic maneuverability. Still, nascent overtures signaling a willingness to engage in dialogue from within RSS echelons hint that even the most diehard ideologues are beginning to read the writing on the wall.

India's broader regional calculus, which has sought to sideline Pakistan through alternative partnerships and connectivity arteries, has increasingly come up against the law of diminishing returns. Far from rendering Pakistan irrelevant, recent twists and turns have, in more ways than one, thrust it back into the thick of critical geopolitical deliberations, laying bare the constraints of India's unilateral strategic brinkmanship. At the same time, the personalization of Indian foreign policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's tight-fisted stewardship has further cramped the scope for calibrated, nuanced engagement.



Set against the sobering realities of nuclear deterrence, the rapid advent of military technologies, and the looming specter of bloc polarization, the perils of escalation far eclipse any speculative windfall. In such a perilous, high-wire arena, peace has ceased to be a mere diplomatic nicety; rather, it has become an inescapable strategic imperative.

Ultimately, durable peace in South Asia will depend on abandoning zero-sum mentalities, normalizing people-to-people contact, and institutionalizing an uninterrupted, unconditional dialogue. Only by moving beyond ideological rigidity and geopolitical hubris can both states begin to turn the page on a history defined by mistrust and missed opportunities.

INTRODUCTION:

The more raw the exercise of power, the more compellingly effective it appears. To many, war is an easy recourse, yet it is hardly a panacea. In contemporary times, even materially weaker states can rob great powers of what they deemed an inevitable victory. However, power is not always raw; sometimes it is subtle, as is diplomacy. While guns and boats are more manifest, diplomacy and dialogue are often a pathway to “durable peace.” Pakistan and India have tested war; now it is time to give diplomacy a chance.

The RSS, which began as a movement for social and cultural regeneration, insidiously crept into the machinery of Indian statecraft. The RSS gradually consolidated a narrative of exclusive nationalism, steadily saffronizing public discourse and state policies. It deepened and exacerbated Hindu-Muslim divisions to cement political power through nationalist mobilization, emerging as an ideological mainstay of the BJP¹ and an impediment to peace between India and Pakistan. In light of the foregoing, the RSS

General Secretary's openness to dialogue with Pakistan is a promising opening for rapprochement between India and Pakistan.


"[W]e should not close the doors. We should always be ready to engage in dialogue. That is why diplomatic relations are maintained, trade and commerce continue, and visas are being given. So we should not stop these."²

(RSS Secretary General Dattatreya Hosabale)

However, his words should not be mistaken for a change of heart; they are an implicit admission of the uncanny meltdown of India's decade-long strategy toward Pakistan under Narendra Modi. As they say, "one often finds one's destiny on the road to avoid it." India's own irresponsible behavior after the unfortunate Pahalgam incident re-hyphenated it with Pakistan. India's reckless night raid, meant to erode Pakistan's military deterrence, cemented it. India seeks Pakistan's isolation, yet its own actions have opened strategic space for Pakistan in the Middle East's peace and security. It is India that has furnished Pakistan with an opportunity for a kind of entente with the USA, while India's significance to the US's Indo-Pacific strategy has dwindled. The pillars of India's strategy of controlled dominance vis-à-vis Pakistan and its policy of strategic autonomy have turned out to be hollow.



In the wake of the May debacle, India may harbor a renewed appetite for aggression. Nonetheless, within the South Asian context, war remains a fundamentally irrational choice. In addition to war-mongering undermining prosperity, the nuclearized environment of South Asia dramatically raises the costs of aggression. The development of new military technologies particularly increases the risk of escalation beyond what decision-makers can anticipate. Furthermore, given the mutual defense agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, any conflict between Pakistan and India is unlikely to remain bilateral. The growing alliance between India and Israel would add another layer of complexity and could serve as a precursor to bloc politics if peace is not achieved. Consequently, peace is an ineluctable necessity for South Asia.



Peace between historic rivals is not achieved merely by signing accords; it is cultivated by a fundamental shift in how each side views the other's place in its strategic framework and, more profoundly, by a genuine change in the hearts and minds of its people. Therefore, for a durable peace between Pakistan and India, India must embrace

Pakistan as an equal and recognize peaceful coexistence as the ultimate goal of their longstanding rivalry. This requires India to abandon any aspirations of regional dominance and reject zero-sum thinking, replacing them with a commitment to regional integration. To achieve this, India must move beyond the fixation on Pakistan that often pervades its domestic electoral politics. Furthermore, India should join Pakistan in fostering people-to-people contacts to build grassroots acceptance of peace. Ultimately, India must enter into discussions with Pakistan without preconditions and engage in a comprehensive, multifaceted dialogue.




RSS AND THE ROLE OF HINDU NATIONALISM IN SHAPING INDIAN POLICY

Ideologies are inherently exclusionary, and once politics becomes subsumed within an ideological framework, it invariably acquires a divisive character. The Indian subcontinent has historically constituted a civilizational mosaic of diverse traditions and cultures. Yet the RSS's "iron band"³ has progressively sought to compress this plurality into a singular anti-Muslim political consciousness. And from hatred doth its power thrive; politics of antagonism derives much of the RSS's mobilizational power.

The relationship between the RSS and the BJP is not peripheral but foundational; the RSS is the progenitor of the BJP. Its cadres founded the Bharatiya Jana Sangh in 1951, and after the Janata Party experiment collapsed in 1980, former Jana Sangh leaders reconstituted themselves as the BJP. The RSS serves as both the cradle of BJP leaders and the ideological bedrock of its followership. In fact, Narendra Modi is one of the RSS's pracharak.

The RSS functions as an ideological ecosystem provider for the BJP, cultivating the political soil from which the party draws its vitality. From the Ayodhya agitation to the Modi era, the RSS has transformed identity and fear into cohesive voting blocs to the benefit of the BJP. For instance, the Sangh's networks deliberately targeted Muslims to galvanize Hindu voters in Gujarat,



often described as the “laboratory of Hindutva.”⁴ Furthermore, the RSS maintains that minorities must assimilate into India’s Hindu-dominated national essence. The consequence of this worldview is the emergence of campaigns such as “love jihad,” “ghar wapsi,” and violence against Christians on Christmas.



Foreign policy typically unfolds across a spectrum of hues, yet Indian foreign policy, much like Indian statecraft itself, has taken on a distinctly saffron tint. The BJP has increasingly tailored its external engagements to resonate with majoritarian sensibilities at home. This tendency is most visible in India’s South Asia policy: confrontational postures toward Pakistan, paired with quiet encouragement of Hindu-nationalist causes in places such as Nepal. Notably, the BJP’s brand of populism frequently casts Pakistan as the existential adversary of the Hindu nation. In this framing, issues such as the Kashmir dispute or border skirmishes are reimagined through a Hindu-Muslim prism. Likewise, BJP leaders repeatedly warn of “infiltration” (mainly

Bangladeshi) as an electoral issue.⁵ Such majoritarian framing can make conciliatory foreign policy unpopular at home.

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Broadly speaking, Hindutva's emphasis on India's civilizational pride gives rise to a distinct set of foreign policy ideas. Its proponents favor hard power and a muscular vision of India as a unique civilizational leader ("Vishwaguru"). This focus on hard power tends to constrict the strategic space available to other actors, while the aspiration to civilizational preeminence compels the BJP leadership to respond to foreign crises with high-risk or high-visibility actions. The Pulwama incident serves as a case in point: such episodes are leveraged to signal resolve to domestic audiences, often at the expense of more measured strategic deliberation. The BJP's Pakistan policy became harder-edged under Prime Minister Narendra Modi largely as a populist tool, rather than out of strict strategic logic.

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In contrast to the foregoing, the RSS-BJP relationship is not monolithic. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's style is marked by an "outsize personality" and tight control over the party and state apparatus. His government has systematically co-opted or pressured the media, giving rise to what is known as "Godi media."⁶ It is deeply troubling that, despite India's population of around 1.4 billion, the government alone holds a monopoly on shaping the national narrative, leaving no room for other social or political groups to weigh in. This stranglehold over public discourse flies in the face of democratic ideals and effectively silences those who dare to speak up for reconciliation between Pakistan and India.

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Furthermore, in political appointments, Prime Minister Narendra Modi values personal loyalty over Sangh pedigrees. Modi co-opts core Hindutva themes, but often in pragmatic, political ways that the purist RSS might not choose. In 2023, amid escalating ethnic violence in Manipur, Prime Minister Narendra Modi refrained from visiting the state, seemingly prioritizing political expediency over principled conviction.⁷ Personalization of power, selective ideology, and political pragmatism have led to a conflict between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the RSS. Therefore, while the RSS once served as the incubator for BJP leadership, it has now been eclipsed by what may be called the “Modi-fication” of India.

“Moropant Pingle once said that if you are honored with a shawl after turning 75, it means that you should stop now, you are old; step aside and let others come in.”⁸

(RSS Chief Mohan Bhagwat)



There is a growing sentiment within the RSS that Prime Minister Narendra Modi has cashed in on its ideological currency for political mileage, while the organization is left holding the bag, facing a firestorm of criticism domestically and internationally. In a bid to salvage its tarnished global standing, the RSS organized an event at the Hudson Institute in April 2026,⁹ a clear sign of a broader push to articulate its worldview and civilizational perspective to American strategic circles. Today, several pressing questions surround the future of Indian foreign policy, which is deeply intertwined with the country's internal narrative. Is the RSS still the driving force shaping India's ideological and political debate, or has that role shifted elsewhere? Does it continue to wield real influence over the BJP's strategic direction, or has centralized political control and electoral pragmatism constrained its authority? Finally, in the current power configuration, is the RSS still a leading voice in setting national discourse, or has it been reduced to reacting to a political narrative now largely defined beyond its institutional grasp?



HOW DID INDIA'S DECADES-LONG STRATEGY SUDDENLY UNRAVEL?

A determined and dignified Pakistan remains the principal structural impediment to India's quest for regional primacy.

Guided by its ideological progenitor, the RSS, the BJP has increasingly interpreted regional geopolitics through an absolutist prism while aspiring to establish regional hegemony. A determined and dignified Pakistan remains the principal structural impediment to India's quest for regional primacy. Consequently, India's regional and broader grand strategy has long been designed to marginalize Pakistan from the strategic calculus of South Asia.



As India rose on the global stage, its strategic outlook increasingly reflected the logic outlined by Happymon Jacob in his Foreign Affairs essay, “The End of South Asia.”¹⁰ Rather than investing in a region defined by shared South Asian institutions, New Delhi began to pursue an Asian vision of its role in the world. While India appeared willing to accommodate China’s rise and share influence in the wider Asian balance of power, it sought to shape its immediate neighborhood on terms that largely excluded Pakistan. As the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) drifted



into paralysis, New Delhi increasingly invested in alternative regional frameworks that offered greater scope for Indian leadership. In doing so, it sought to sideline Pakistan from South Asia’s evolving economic and security architecture while drawing neighboring states into an India-centered regional order through initiatives such as BIMSTEC and the Colombo Security Conclave.

Pakistan was weighed down by both internal fragilities and external pressures, and India’s strategy appeared, for a time, to be yielding results. Ironically, however, India’s own conduct reversed the gains accrued through years of strategic investment.



For any state to assert regional hegemony, it must possess credible military capability. Such capability is not measured merely by defense spending, troop strength, or the acquisition of advanced hardware. Rather, military power is ultimately validated by operational performance under contested battlefield conditions. In this respect, India's hegemonic aspirations were fundamentally shaken on the night of 6-7th May. India's strategy of establishing controlled dominance over Pakistan rested on the flawed assumption that Pakistan had become militarily enfeebled and strategically demoralized. Therefore, Pakistan's military performance delivered a technological and strategic shock that profoundly disrupted India's long-standing strategic calculus.

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India, with its expansive economy, substantial consumer market, and considerable reservoir of skilled labor, has consistently resisted any attempt to be hyphenated with Pakistan and has persistently lobbied the international community to treat it as a qualitatively distinct power. For years, as Pakistan grappled with economic distress, terrorist violence, and political instability, Indian policymakers viewed these developments with strategic satisfaction. However, the intense and somewhat unexpected confrontation following the Pahalgam incident precipitated the reassertion of Pakistan's strategic relevance and military credibility, thereby re-hyphenating Pakistan with India in regional and global strategic discourse.



Furthermore, Pakistan's emergence as a mediator in a potential Iran–US peace initiative has dispelled notions of its alleged diplomatic isolation. Pakistan has not merely assumed the role of mediator but has also encouraged Middle Eastern states to move away from confrontation toward sustainable peace and regional de-escalation. India, by contrast, has remained conspicuously absent from these diplomatic processes.

This underscores that, despite extensive trade linkages with numerous states, India lacks the substantive diplomatic leverage needed to shape critical regional developments.¹¹ Consequently, Pakistan's diplomatic clout now appears, at least in certain theaters, to surpass that of India.

India's strategic autonomy was never entirely endogenous; rather, it rested upon the patronage of a dominant global power.

For decades, India pursued a doctrine of strategic autonomy that closely resembled strategic hedging. Yet India's strategic autonomy was never entirely endogenous; rather, it rested on the patronage of a dominant global power, first the USSR and subsequently the United States. India was permitted to exercise strategic autonomy so long as the United States and Europe adhered to a conventional containment posture vis-à-vis China. However, with the transformation of Washington's strategic posture toward Beijing, India will no longer be able to sustain the latitude it once described as strategic autonomy. Instead, India risks increasingly being perceived as a potential strategic competitor, much as the United States now regrets not viewing China twenty years earlier. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau said, "We are not going to make the same mistakes with India that we made with China 20 years ago."¹² Moreover, the downgrading of the Quad from the head-of-state level to the ministerial level¹³ has thrown India's strategic calculations into disarray. India's gradual loss of centrality within the U.S. Indo-Pacific framework¹⁴ may ultimately erode the very foundations of its strategic autonomy.



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The U.S.–India relationship is a far cry from what it once was under the two countries’ “Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership.”¹⁵ As a result, India’s much-vaunted strategic autonomy appears to be hemmed in on all sides. Washington has become more forthcoming in scrutinizing and publicly calling out New Delhi’s ties with other states. A prime example is U.S. criticism of India’s continued purchases of Russian oil¹⁶, an arrangement that Washington initially turned a blind eye to and, to some extent, made allowances for.

India once projected itself as a leading voice of the Global South. Yet its rhetoric of Global South solidarity increasingly appears hollow. This rhetoric served as a corollary to India’s strategic autonomy, enabling it to secure diplomatic and economic benefits from states dissatisfied with the US-led international order. However, with the



erosion of India's strategy for regional dominance, New Delhi has abandoned much of its professed commitment to Global South causes and aligned itself "with full conviction"¹⁷ with Israel, despite broader global opinion, particularly across the Global South, condemning Israel's actions. While India has framed its support for Israel as a response to Islamist extremism, its engagement with the Taliban presents a contradiction in that stance. Moreover, while India persistently projects itself as the world's largest democracy and a defender of international norms, it notably refrained, unlike Pakistan, from condemning the onslaught on Iran. As a result, India can no longer convincingly sustain the posture it once cultivated as a champion of the Global South.

WHY HAS PEACE BECOME A STRATEGIC NECESSITY IN SOUTH ASIA?

Historical epochs marked by relative peace have consistently nurtured prosperity and human flourishing. Peace, in this light, is not merely a desirable political end but a foundational one. Though war has long been extolled as the ultima ratio of statecraft, the strategic terrain of South Asia defies such classical logic. Bertrand Russell, in *A History of Western Philosophy*, distilled Machiavelli's political realism thus: "It is futile to pursue a political purpose by methods that are bound to fail."¹⁸ By the same token, for India and Pakistan, protracted antagonism cuts squarely against the grain of their respective national interests. Any all-out conflagration between the two would unleash cataclysmic repercussions across the subcontinent. Even a victor, should one emerge, would find its triumph nothing short of Pyrrhic, a hollow gain paid for at an exorbitant price. Consequently, peace has devolved into a *sine qua non* for the region.

The dawning of the nuclear age has radically recalibrated the logic of deterrence. In the pre-atomic era, deterrence hinged largely on quantitative military preponderance. Yet nuclear arsenals—particularly by virtue of their counter-value capabilities—have


upended the traditional hierarchy between power and deterrence. South Asia now stands as a fully nuclearized theatre, with both Pakistan and India fielding increasingly sophisticated nuclear triads. Moreover, the advent of hypersonic weaponry has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of missile defense systems, rendering them impotent as guaranteed shields against a potential nuclear onslaught. In the absence of robust nuclear risk-reduction frameworks and institutionalized de-escalation mechanisms, even a minor provocation could ignite a regional Armageddon. Hence, at the very minimum, a stable *modus vivendi* is indispensable to forestall strategic catastrophe in the region.

Any future hostilities between India and Pakistan are unlikely to remain bottled up within South Asia; they carry an inherent risk of spilling over into the Middle East. Through the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan has effectively projected its deterrence posture into a broader trans-regional alignment, thereby raising the escalation costs for India. Simultaneously, India's deepening strategic partnership with Israel risks rubbing other Middle Eastern actors up the wrong way. In



the absence of dispute resolution or meaningful confidence-building measures, the spectre of bloc politics looms large across the wider region—a development that would deal a severe blow to regional integration and cooperative security.

India's strategic worldview rests on the conviction that its vast expanse, demographic heft, and economic dynamism make it an indispensable player in the great-power competition. Nevertheless, New Delhi appears to downplay the degree to which intensifying Sino-American rivalry could cramp its strategic autonomy and shrink its room to manoeuvre. As great-power competition heats up, the diplomatic resolution of outstanding disputes in South Asia becomes ever more urgent—both to alleviate external pressures and to safeguard long-term national interests. In such a geopolitical climate, the only viable antidote to external vulnerabilities lies in forging a durable peace across the region.



The strategic imperative for peace in South Asia transcends narrow security arithmetic, drawing equal vigour from compelling economic realities. Despite an estimated trade potential of some \$67 billion,¹⁹ the region remains the world's least integrated in terms of intra-regional commerce and people-to-people connectivity—a chronic bottleneck that continues to hobble both collective advancement and individual national prosperity. Even India, wrestling with a poverty rate of 5.25%²⁰ and persistent employment pressures, stands to reap substantial dividends from deeper regional cooperation.

In recent years, New Delhi has sought to hedge its bets and broaden its strategic options through alternative connectivity frameworks—the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC), and the development of Chabahar Port. Yet these routes are often more expensive, more circuitous, and more operationally cumbersome, rendering them less efficient and less sustainable in the long run than direct overland connectivity through Pakistan—the most geographically natural and cost-effective bridge to Central Asia. In strategic terms,



circumventing this route amounts to swimming against the current of geography rather than harnessing its inherent advantages.

HOW CAN INDIA AND PAKISTAN MOVE TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE PEACE?

The principal impediment to sustainable peace in South Asia is the extremist conception of Akhand Bharat, India's ideological aspiration to negate Pakistan's legitimacy. India must recognize that any grand strategy predicated on regional hegemony will inevitably clash with Pakistan's destined rise and may generate destabilizing consequences for the entire region, as discussed above. Therefore, if India genuinely seeks a durable regional equilibrium, as Pakistan does, it must engage Pakistan on the basis of mutual respect, sovereign equality, and national dignity.

At the societal level, the peoples of India and Pakistan share deep historical and civilizational ties, creating a common cultural space while preserving their distinct national identities. Consequently, peace initiatives would likely receive broad popular support on both sides. However, the Indian media ecosystem, particularly the so-called "Godi Media," influenced by the RSS and the BJP, often manufactures antagonistic narratives that malign Pakistan. In contrast, Pakistan has consistently sought to cultivate goodwill among the Indian public through conciliatory gestures. For instance, Indian Punjabi pilgrims visiting Pakistan's sacred sites via the Kartarpur corridor frequently return with positive impressions of Pakistan's hospitality, pluralism, and inclusivity. India must reciprocate Pakistan's willingness to pursue rapprochement, and both states should institutionalize people-to-people engagement through cultural, religious, and artistic exchanges.

“Ordinary citizens generally do not have much to do with politics. When friendship develops between the people of two countries, it naturally helps improve relations between the countries themselves.”²¹

(Former Indian Army Chief Gen Manoj Naravane)

Furthermore, the BJP’s politicization of Pakistan within India’s domestic electoral discourse constrains the prospects for meaningful diplomacy. No comparable dynamic exists in Pakistan, where electoral politics remains overwhelmingly focused on domestic governance rather than on relations with India. Therefore, if the BJP is sincere in its professed interest in peace, it must reconsider the instrumentalization of Pakistan in its domestic political strategy.



For any India–Pakistan dialogue to succeed, it must proceed without preconditions. Most significantly, India must do away with preconditions rooted in unsubstantiated allegations of terrorism, claims that, under India’s new normal, would necessitate a retaliatory strike on Pakistan.



India’s attempts to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty (WTI) lay bare its bid to entrench its hydro-hegemony as the upper riparian state.²² By wielding a resource upon which millions of Pakistanis depend as a tool of political coercion, New Delhi appears bent on cornering Islamabad into renegotiating the treaty on terms disproportionately slanted in its favor. In doing so, India has needlessly thrust the water issue into the cauldron of an already incendiary bilateral rivalry. Slogans like “blood and water cannot flow together”²³ run the grave risk of inflaming public sentiment and lending legitimacy to the militarization of water resources. Such posturing and policies are especially perilous, given that water constitutes an existential lifeline for Pakistan. Any deliberate move to severely curtail river flows would almost certainly be construed in Islamabad

as a *casus belli* rather than a negotiating ploy.²⁴ It could precipitate a dangerous spiral, transforming water into an even more volatile flashpoint than the myriad disputes already festering between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. In a worst-case scenario, Pakistan might be driven to strike at infrastructure perceived as enabling the throttling of water, thereby ratcheting up the specter of armed conflict. It is high time, therefore, that India came to its senses.

Pakistan, for its part, remains committed to resolving all outstanding disputes, including the Kashmir issue, through a direct, structured, and comprehensive dialogue process. Pakistan views India's preference for an issue-by-issue approach as an attempt to extract unilateral concessions while avoiding meaningful engagement with the core disputes underpinning bilateral tensions. Consequently, both states must enter into a sustained, comprehensive dialogue framework, free from preconditions and guided by a genuine commitment to durable peace.



CONCLUSION:

The trajectory of Indian policy in recent decades reflects a complex interplay of ideology and geopolitical realities. The RSS has undeniably shaped the vocabulary of Indian statecraft, particularly in framing identity, nationalism, and Pakistan as a perennial “other.” Yet its influence has increasingly been filtered through the personalized authority of the Modi-led political order, in which pragmatic electoral considerations often outweigh ideological purity.

At the regional level, India’s ambition to reshape South Asia into an India-centered strategic space has fallen short of its intended objectives. Efforts to bypass Pakistan through alternative regional corridors and institutions have not eliminated the structural realities of geography or deterrence. Instead, they have underscored the limits of exclusionary regional designs in a nuclearized environment.

For both India and Pakistan, sustained confrontation imposes mounting strategic and economic costs. In this context, durable peace is not a normative aspiration but a strategic necessity. The future of South Asia will depend less on ideological contestation and more on whether both states can move from zero-sum thinking to managed coexistence grounded in mutual recognition and strategic restraint.

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²³ TOI News Desk, “Water and blood cannot flow together”: PM Modi signals no reversal on Indus Water Treaty suspension,” *Times of India*, May 15, 2025, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/water-and-blood-cannot-flow-together-pm-modi-signals-no-reversal-on-indus-waters-treaty-suspension/articleshow/121116091.cms>.

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